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Abstract
I put forward precise and appealing notions of reference, self-reference, and well-
foundedness for sentences of the language of first-order Peano arithmetic extended
with a truth predicate. These notions are intended to play a central role in the study
of the reference patterns that underlie expressions leading to semantic paradox and,
thus, in the construction of philosophically well-motivated semantic theories of truth.
Keywords Semantic paradoxes · Reference · Self-reference · Well-foundedness
1 Introduction
What is the root of semantic paradox? According to a widely believed hypothesis,
famously championed by Russell, Poincare´, and Tarski, the blame can be attributed
to circularity. In the case of paradoxes involving truth, such as the paradox of the
liar and Curry’s paradox, a natural development of this hypothesis diagnoses their
paradoxicality as arising from self-reference.
Although this view has been around for more than a century, the self-reference
diagnosis has never been properly elaborated. The main reason is that the notions of
reference and self-reference have proven to be very elusive, despite their frequent use
in heuristic contexts in mathematics and mathematical logic.1
An additional challenge facing the self-reference diagnosis arises from the Visser-
Yablo paradox, involving an infinite list of sentences each of which says that the
1For instance, by Go¨del [5]. See Smoryn´ski [26] for a pessimistic study of the development of self-
reference in logic and mathematics so far and Picollo [21] for more optimistic prospects for the
future.
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subsequent sentences are untrue.2 Appealing to plausible truth principles, it can be
shown, paradoxically, that none of these sentences can be true but at least one of them
must be at the same time. Many authors have questioned whether the Visser-Yablo
paradox exhibits genuine self-reference: since every sentence on the list apparently
refers only to the ones that show up later, none obviously refers back to itself.
While the Visser-Yablo paradox triggered an extensive discussion of reference,
self-reference, and paradoxicality, one of the main upshots has proven to be that the
notions of reference (and self-reference) in the literature are not fit for purpose: the
primary contenders are often imprecise, defective, and in some cases even trivial.3
On this note, the debate ended with a serious scepticism.
My main aim in this paper is to present a systematic and rigorous account of
reference in the context of truth, which I call “alethic reference”, in order to show
this scepticism is unfounded. I provide a formally well-defined account of reference
and self-reference which, I argue, coheres with and generalizes our guiding intuitive
judgements of referentiality. My account is then used to assess the self-reference
diagnosis of semantic paradoxicality; I argue that the diagnosis fails, since the Visser-
Yablo paradox does not involve self-reference in the relevant sense. However, my
theory of reference can nevertheless be used to show that there is a grain of truth in
the self-reference hypothesis: in my companion paper [22] I show how restricting the
T-schema to sentences which do not exhibit certain problematic patterns of reference
– including but not exhausted by self-reference – allows us to construct classically
consistent, sound, and attractive theories of truth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a technical introduc-
tion, followed by an overview of the state of the issue regarding the inadequacy
of extent notions of reference and self-reference deployed in the literature on the
semantic paradoxes. Section 3 then puts forward precise definitions of reference, self-
reference, well-foundedness, and other related concepts, which, I argue, overcome
the main obstacles faced by the pre-existing notions. Finally, in Section 4 I extract
some conclusions.
2 Technical and Philosophical Preliminaries
2.1 Formal Truth Theories
Let L be the language of first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) and let LT augment L
with a monadic predicate T, to express truth. L contains =, ¬,∧,∨,→, ∀, and ∃ as
logical constants, an individual constant 0, a monadic function symbol S, two dyadic
function symbols + and ×, and a finite stock of extra function symbols for primitive
recursive (p.r.) functions to be specified. All other logical and non-logical symbols
occurring in formulae are to be understood as the usual abbreviations. Let N be the
2See Herzberger [12], Visser [28], and Yablo [29, 30].
3As stressed by Leitgeb [18] and Cook [4]. A pessimistic conclusion is also reached in Halbach & Visser
[7, 8].
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standard interpretation of L , with ω as its domain. Then, for each n ∈ ω, L has a
term n (the numeral of n) denoting n, consisting of n occurrences of S followed by 0.
We work with a fixed (effective and monotonic) coding of expressions of LT by
numbers in ω. If σ is a string of symbols of LT, we write σ for the numeral of
its code.4 We often identify expressions of LT with their codes if there’s no room
for confusion. Unless otherwise indicated, by “formula” and “sentence” we mean
formula of LT and sentence of LT, respectively.
Although LT speaks in the first instance about natural numbers, the arithmetiza-
tion of syntax allows it to express many syntactic properties, relations, and functions.
Thus truth theories can be formulated in LT, with background syntactic principles
formulated in L .
Theories can have either a semantic or an axiomatic presentation. A semantic truth
theory consists of a model or family of models 〈N, 〉 expanding N to LT, where
 is the extension of T in the model. By contrast, axiomatic truth theories result
from adding truth-theoretic axioms to a syntax theory – usually PA. We assume PA
contains the defining recursion equations for each extra function symbol in L . As
is well known, PA is strong enough to represent every recursive relation between
numbers and, therefore, expressions of LT, and to weakly represent every recursively
enumerable relation. Let PAT consist of the axioms of PA formulated in LT with
induction for the whole language. Call an axiomatic truth theory in LT any recursive
extension of PAT. Of course, some theories will be highly incomplete and others
simply unsound, but the terminology is convenient.
2.2 Diagonalization and Tarski’s Theorem
Ideally, any truth theory (whether semantic or axiomatic) would satisfy Tarski’s con-
dition of material adequacy, according to which all instances of the following schema
hold in the theory:
Tϕ ↔ ϕ (T-schema)
This is often called a “disquotational” principle, and its instances “T-biconditionals”.
Unfortunately, it cannot be implemented unrestrictedly, as the language is ‘expressive
enough’ to allow for paradoxical expressions such as liar sentences.
Let v abbreviate a string of variables v1, . . . , vn different from x and y.5
Theorem 1 (Diagonalization) For every formula ϕ(x, v) there is a formula ψ(v)
s.t. the (universal closure of the) following equivalence is a theorem of PAT:
ψ(v) ↔ ϕ(ψ, v) (1)
4We require that the coding is effective and monotonic to avoid certain issues brought up by Heck [10]
and Halbach & Visser [7, 8]. An effective coding is such that, given a number n, there is an algorithm to
determine which expression it codifies (if any) and, vice versa, given an expression σ there is an algorithm
that delivers the code of σ . A coding is monotonic if, for every two expressions σ and σ ′, if σ occurs in
σ ′, then the code of σ is smaller than the code of σ ′.
5The following result due to Montague [20] is a generalization to formulae with an arbitrary number of free
variables of a theorem of Carnap [3], which in turn generalizes Go¨del’s construction of a self-referential
statement for the proof of his first incompleteness theorem.
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Proof Let Diag(x, y) represent the p.r. diagonalization function that takes a formula
ϕ(x, v) and returns ∀x (x = ϕ(x, v) → ϕ(x, v)). Then,
∀x (x = ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y, v)) → ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y, v))) (2)
is the result of diagonalizing ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y, v)). Notice that (2) is the ψ(v)
we are looking for. Let n be the code of (2). (2) is logically equivalent to
∀y (Diag(∀y(Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y, v)), y) → ϕ(y, v))
which is equivalent in PAT to ϕ(n, v). Thus, the following is a theorem of PAT:
∀x (x = ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y, v)) → ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ϕ(y, v))) ↔ ϕ(n, v)
This is the ‘universal’ proof of the diagonal lemma. An analogous ‘existential’
proof can be given in terms of an alternative diagonalization function represented
by Diag∃(x, y) that maps each formula ϕ(x, v) to ∃x (x = ϕ(x, v) ∧ ϕ(x, v)).
Applying ‘existential’ diagonalization to the predicate ∃y (Diag∃(x, y)∧ϕ(y, v)) we
also obtain a suitable ψ(v). This and the proof of Theorem 1 will become relevant
later.
In equivalences of the form (1), ψ(v) is said to be a fixed point of ϕ(x, v). If
x is the only free variable in ϕ, ψ is a sentence, commonly regarded as saying of
itself that it has the property expressed by ϕ(x), whatever exactly that is. Thus, fixed-
point sentences are considered to be self-referential, and diagonalization is seen as
the paradigmatic mechanism for obtaining such self-referential sentences.
Let ϕ in Theorem 1 be ¬Tx. Then we know there is a sentence λ such that the
following is a theorem of PAT:
λ ↔ ¬Tλ (3)
λ is normally understood as a liar sentence, i.e. a sentence saying of itself that it is
untrue. Given (3), no classical consistent extension of PAT can contain an instance
of the T-schema for λ and, a fortiori, unrestricted disquotation is untenable. This, in
essence, is Tarski’s undefinability result. Similar results arise for semantic theories of
truth. No model 〈N, 〉 of LT can validate the T-biconditional for λ, as all theorems
of PAT are true in 〈N, 〉, including (3). Thus, we say λ is paradoxical.
Another example of a paradox is given by the following:
κ ↔ (Tκ → 0 = 0) (4)
This biconditional obtains in PAT by Theorem 1, diagonalizing Tx → 0 = 0. κ is
taken to be a Curry sentence, i.e. a sentence that says of itself that it entails something
false. Just like in the case of the liar, the T-biconditional for κ is inconsistent with (4),
so we say κ is paradoxical.
As a final example of paradoxicality consider the following 2-liar cycle:
λ1 ↔ ¬Tλ2 (5)
λ2 ↔ Tλ1
Theorem 1 guarantees that both biconditionals are provable in PAT by diagonalizing
¬TTx˙. Given a formula ϕ with exactly one free variable v, let ϕ(v˙) be short
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for ϕ(v˙/v), where x˙ is a term of L for the p.r. function that maps each natural
number to the code of its numeral, and x(y/z) for the (p.r.) substitution function that
takes a formula ϕ, a term t , and a variable v and returns the formula that results
from replacing all free occurrences of v in ϕ with t . Since v is free in ϕ(v˙), we
can quantify over it. Clearly, the equivalences in (5) are inconsistent with the T-
biconditionals for λ1 and λ2; so we say the latter are paradoxical.
2.3 The Visser-Yablo Paradox and (Self-)Reference
According to the self-reference diagnosis, all paradoxical expressions involving truth
share a common reference pattern, namely, self-reference. This is intuitively clear
in the case of the liar, Curry sentences, and of liar cycles, but not so much of the
sentences that comprise the Visser-Yablo paradox, each of which say only of the ones
that follow that they are untrue. The existence of the Visser-Yablo sentences can be
proved in PAT, diagonalizing the formula ∀z (z > w → ¬Tx(z˙/w)). By Theorem
1, there is a predicate Y(w) such that
∀w (Y(w) ↔ ∀z (z > w → ¬TY(z˙)))
is provable in PAT. Instantiating w in each numeral, we obtain the following
biconditionals, i.e. the list:
Y(0) ↔ ∀z (z > 0 → ¬TY(z˙)) (6)
Y(1) ↔ ∀z (z > 1 → ¬TY(z˙))
. . .
Y(n) ↔ ∀z (z > n → ¬TY(z˙))
. . .
By reductio ad absurdum, from the T-biconditionals for Y(n) we can easily derive
¬TY(n) for each n ∈ ω, as well as ¬∀z¬TY(z˙). On the other hand, ∀z¬TY(z˙)
does not follow in PAT plus the T-biconditionals, which means that the theory is
consistent.6 However, note that no model 〈N, 〉 of LT can make all T-biconditionals
for each Y(n) true at the same time: since each ¬TY(n) would have to be true
in the model, so would ∀z¬TY(z˙). For these reasons, the Visser-Yablo paradox
is not considered to be a paradox in the strict sense, but an ω-paradox. Despite not
directly leading to a contradiction in our axiomatic theories, it is still problematic, as
no semantic truth theory can validate all T-biconditionals for the sentences in the list.
The presence or absence of self-reference in the Visser-Yablo list has been exten-
sively discussed in the literature.7 It ultimately transpired that the notions of reference
and self-reference deployed in the discussion were incomplete, defective, and in some
cases even trivial. As Leitgeb points out, there are at least two notions of reference at
play in the debate, a ‘naı¨ve’ and an ‘incomplete’ one. According to the naı¨ve account,
6See Hardy [9] and Ketland [14, 15]. Note that inferring ∀z¬TY(z˙) from the set of all its instances
¬TY(n) would require an infinitary rule, not admissible in finitary systems such as the ones we are
working with.
7See, for instance, Priest [23], Beall [1], and Cook [4].
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self-referential sentences ψ are fixed points of some predicate ϕ(v), as in (1). This
accounts for the liar, liar cycles, and other paradoxical expressions such as Curry sen-
tences. Underlying this notion of self-reference is the idea that a sentence refers to
every object that is mentioned in an equivalent expression:
Naı¨ve reference: a sentence ϕ refers to an object o (e.g. a sentence) if there is a
sentence ψ(t) that is (e.g. arithmetically) equivalent to ϕ and t denotes o.
This notion is naı¨ve in the sense of being trivial. For instance, every sentence ϕ is
(logically) equivalent to ϕ ∧ (Tϕ → Tϕ) and, more generally, to ϕ ∧ (Tψ →
Tψ), where ψ can be any sentence. As a consequence, every sentence refers to
every sentence, including itself. This is unacceptable; a good notion of reference must
impose more restrictive criteria.
According to the second notion Leitgeb traces in the literature, sentences can refer
to an object in two ways. They can either contain a term denoting the object or state
something about it by means of a description:
Incomplete reference: 1. Reference by mention: a sentence ϕ refers to an object
o if it contains a term denoting o.
2. Reference by description:8 a sentence of the form ∀x (ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) refers
to an object o if the latter satisfies ϕ(x).
This notion nicely reflects pre-theoretical intuitions. For instance, the sentence
¬T0 = 0 surely refers to 0 = 0; and the sentence ∀x (BewPA(x) → Tx), stating
that all theorems of PA are true, surely refers to the theorems of PA.
The problem with incomplete reference, however, is that it gives no information
as to whether (and how) quantified sentences of a different logical form may refer:
for instance, sentences of the form ∀x ϕ where ϕ is not a conditional and existential
claims. It is by no means clear how to fill in this gap to account for, e.g. the prima
facie self-referential status of the liar in (3) or the cycle of liars in (5), given that we
cannot hold that reference is closed under logical equivalence, on pain of trivializing
the notion. In Milne’s words,
Provable material equivalence in a theory is not normally a criterion of
synonymy so we must suppose that it is something particular to go¨del bicondi-
tionals that is at issue. For a number of reasons the case is hard to make. (Milne
[19, p. 212])
The deficiency of both available concepts led many to adopt a rather pessimistic
attitude towards the notions of reference and self-reference, in particular in the
context of arithmetic. Leitgeb [18, p. 13] writes: “we either suspect that much philo-
sophical work lies ahead of us before the question is finally settled, or that otherwise
the question is ill-posed, i.e. that the talk of self-referentiality is to be banished from
scientific contexts”. It’s now time to abandon this pessimistic attitude, at least when
8I’m following Heck’s [10] terminology here. The tacit underlying idea is that claims of the form
∀x (ϕ(x) → ψ(x)) are restricted quantificational claims, saying of the ϕs that they are ψ .
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it comes to reference in the context of theories of truth.9 In the next section I advance
a natural way of completing the incomplete notion of reference just in the context
of truth, giving the expected verdict for all (normally considered to be) clear cases,
including the liar and its variants.
With the right notions of alethic reference and self-reference in place, we will be in
a position to properly evaluate the orthodox view on semantic paradoxes. Moreover,
the new notions also allow us to formulate sensible restrictive criteria for instances
of disquotation resulting in philosophically and technically appealing truth theories,
as shown in my companion paper [22].
3 Alethic Reference
3.1 Four Features of Reference
The main purpose of this section is to give an adequate and precise definition of
reference in the context of truth, inspired by and extending the incomplete notion
outlined in Section 2.3. But before we start, four remarks are in order.
First, one should be careful to confuse the notion of reference we are after neither
with the Fregean notion – the truth value of a sentence – nor with the notion of about-
ness.10 Although they have a strong family resemblance, reference is more tied to
the syntactic structure of sentences than aboutness. While tautologies are sometimes
considered to be about nothing in particular because they convey no information,
we would intuitively say that expressions such as Tϕ → Tϕ still refer to ϕ, as
Leitgeb’s incomplete notion predicts.11
Second, and related to the previous point, closure under logical equivalence should
not be required from a definition of reference, as indicated in Section 2.3. On pain of
triviality, reference cannot be extensional. It must be hyperintensional.
Third, throughout the paper we will understand reference exclusively as a binary
relation between sentences of LT, and not between sentences and numbers. The rea-
son is simple. We are concerned with arithmetic not as a theory of numbers but of
syntax, for the study of formal truth theories and the semantic paradoxes and related
phenomena that might affect them.
Note that, since reference to sentences is achieved via a coding, whether a sentence
refers to another will inevitably depend on the coding we choose. This choice, even if
restricted to effective and monotonic codings, is always fairly arbitrary. As a conse-
quence, what sentences an expression refers to is also very often an arbitrary matter.
This is to be expected. The coding we work with fixes the denotation of the terms of
9I hope to have dissipated some doubts already in Picollo [21], as I have shown how to define reference,
self-reference, and other referential patterns in the pure language of arithmetic. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to simply extend those notions to LT, as what we are after in this paper is not reference simpliciter
but a special kind of reference that only concerns the truth predicate. I come back to this in footnote 15.
10See Putnam [24] and Goodman [6] for a historical overview and Urbaniak [27] and Yablo [31] for
modern takes on aboutness.
11See as well Leitgeb [18], Cook [4], Halbach & Visser [7, 8], and footnote 17.
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L to sentences of LT from ‘outside’.12 It is only natural that what a sentence refers
to depends on the denotation of the terms that occur in it. Moreover, the arbitrariness
of the coding will not cause any inconvenience in the formulation of truth systems,
as what counts as an instance of disquotation also depends on the coding and varies
accordingly.13
Finally, we will only focus on alethic reference, that is, reference in the context
of truth. Let BewPA(x) weakly represent provability in PA in a natural way.14 If we
diagonalize ¬BewPA(x) we obtain a sentence γ such that
γ ↔ ¬BewPA(γ) (7)
is provable in PA. γ is also known as the “Go¨del sentence of PA”. Since γ has been
obtained exactly in the same way as the liar sentence λ, one might conclude it is as
self-referential as the latter. Nonetheless, γ is completely unparadoxical, as is every
other expression belonging to the pure language of arithmetic. Self-reference and
other pathological patterns only become dangerous when combined with the truth
predicate (and other semantic or logical notions such as satisfaction, property instan-
tiation, and class membership). Thus, we are only interested in the sentences an
expression ϕ refers to insofar as they fall in the scope of T in ϕ.15 For instance, we
would like to say that ψ = ψ ∧ ¬Tϕ or BewPA(ψ) → Tϕ alethically refer
– or just “refer”, for short – to ϕ but not to ψ . Making this idea precise is the aim of
the rest of this section.
3.2 Reference byMention
The incomplete notion of reference identifies two ways in which sentences may refer:
by mention and by description. Let us first spell out the alethic version of reference
by mention (m-reference) in precise terms.
Definition 1 (M-reference) Let ϕ and ψ be sentences. ϕ m-refers to ψ iff ϕ contains
a subsentence of the form Tt and N  t = ψ.
A sentence ϕ m-refers only to those sentences denoted by closed terms that follow
T in ϕ. This means, on the one hand, that terms occurring in the scope of other
predicates do not play a role, as anticipated. For instance, while ¬BewPA(γ) doesn’t
m-refer to any expression, BewPA(0 = 0) ∧ T0 = 0 m-refers to 0 = 0 but not to
0 = 0. On the other hand, it means that proper subterms of terms occurring after T
are to be ignored. Let ¬. be a function symbol of L representing the p.r. function that
12One might wonder, in the light of Putnam’s [25] model-theoretic argument, if there is an alternative way
of fixing the reference of the terms of a language at all.
13See Heck [10].
14See Halbach & Visser [7, 8].
15This is why extending the notions of reference for the pure language of arithmetic I put forward in
Picollo [21] to LT is not viable, as anticipated in footnote 9. However, they can serve a heuristic role in
the formulation of the alethic notions.
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maps each formula to its negation (and similarly for other logical connectives). Then
T¬. ϕ m-refers not to ϕ but to ¬ϕ.
This may seem too restrictive. Strictly speaking, only the sentence denoted by t
(if any) falls in the scope of the truth predicate in Tt . Nonetheless, one might think
that by ignoring t’s subterms we could be overlooking dangerous reference patterns.
I show this is not the case in my companion paper [22]. Moreover, note that allowing
that Tt m-refers to all denotations of subterms of t would result in a grossly over-
generating notion. For instance, T¬. ϕ would m-refer not only to ϕ but also to every
sentence ψ whose code is smaller than ϕ’s; and the same goes for Tϕ. For ϕ is
a complex term of the form S. . . S0, of which ψ is a subterm. As a consequence,
many expressions would be wrongfully classified as self-referential or unfounded,
prompting unnecessarily restrictive truth theories.
Although the equivalences delivered by Theorem 1 do not suffice to establish
that the fixed points obtained by Diagonalization m-refer to themselves even in the
presence of T, there is a stronger version of this result that does so to a certain extent.
Theorem 2 (Strong Diagonalization) For every formula ϕ(x, v) there is a term t
s.t. the following is a theorem of PA:
t = ϕ(t, v)
We say that ϕ(t, v) is a strong fixed point of ϕ(x, v). A proof of this result can
be found in Jeroslow [13].16 All that is required is that the language contains a
function symbol for the substitution function, as is the case of L . Thus, strongly
diagonalizing, for instance, the predicate ¬Tx, we obtain in PA the following identity:
l = ¬Tl
that is, a sentence that m-refers to itself.17 ¬Tl is a ‘strong’ liar sentence. In general,
strong fixed points of formulae ϕ(x) with subformulae of the form Tx in which x
occurs free are self-m-referential according to Definition 1.
However, self-m-reference might not obtain if, instead, T is followed by an open
term s(x) in ϕ(x). For instance, suppose s(x) represents a function mapping each
sentence to 0 = 0. In that case, every strong fixed point of ¬Ts(x) will refer to
0 = 0 and not to itself. As another example, consider the formula T¬. x. Strong
Diagonalization delivers a term l′ such that
l′ = T¬. l′ (8)
is a theorem of PA. T¬. l′ is a sentence that says not of itself but of its negation that it
is true. However, note that, according to Definition 1, whilst T¬. l′ does not m-refer to
itself, its negation does. Thus, despite not being self-referential T¬. l′ will be deemed
unfounded (cf. Definition 9), as it m-refers to a self-referential expression.
16It is not clear who formulated the result first, but applications of it can be found already in the 1950s,
e.g. by Henkin [11] and Kreisel [16].
17The condition that a sentence m-refers to itself is also known as the “Kreisel-Henkin” criterion for
self-reference. See Halbach & Visser [7].
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All that matters for m-reference is the occurrence of subsentences of the form Tt .
Any two sentences with the same atomic subsentences of this kind m-refer to the
same expressions. This means the notion is trivially compositional: ¬ϕ, ∀v ϕ, and
∃v ϕ m-refer to whatever ϕ m-refers to, and (ϕ∧ψ), (ϕ∨ψ), and (ϕ → ψ) m-refer to
everything either ϕ or ψ m-refer to. Thus, m-reference is closed under negation, but
also renaming of variables and the introduction and elimination of dummy quantifiers
– i.e. that don’t bind any variable. As a consequence, it is also closed under a kind of
equivalence – more fine grained than logical equivalence – that allows for all valid
transformations that do not add or remove types of atoms. Furthermore, m-reference
is closed under Leibniz’s Law: if s = t , then ϕ and ϕ[s/t] m-refer to the same
expressions.
3.3 Reference by Quantiﬁcation
Things are somewhat more complicated in the case of reference by description and, in
general, in cases where reference is achieved via the presence of quantifiers, which I
call “reference by quantification” (or “q-reference”, for short). Let’s start by focusing
on a paradigmatic example, PA’s global reflection principle:
∀x (BewPA(x) → Tx) (GRfnPA)
According to clause 2 of the incomplete notion of reference, (GRfnPA) refers just to
all theorems of PA, for it says only of the latter that they are true. The conditional
following a universal quantifier restricts the referenced sentences to those satisfying
the antecedent of the conditional. Thus, in the absence of a conditional, e.g. in ∀x Tx
and ∀x (BewPA(x) ∧ Tx), it appears that the sentence must refer to everything.
However, we should not endorse these conditions unrestrictedly in the case of
alethic reference.
For one thing, in order to keep reference by mention and reference by quantifica-
tion apart, it seems reasonable to require that a free variable occurs in the scope of the
truth predicate in a sentence for it to refer to other sentences by quantification. For
another, we only say that in a statement of the form ∀v (ϕ(v) → ψ(v)) q-reference
is restricted to the ϕs as long as it is possible to determine which sentences satisfy
ϕ(v): i.e. if T doesn’t occur in ϕ. Only then do we regard the conditional as restrict-
ing reference by means of the antecedent. Recall the aim of this paper is to offer
an appropriate account of reference for the study of the reference patterns underly-
ing paradoxical expressions. However, the ultimate hope (realized in the companion
paper [22]) is to find shared patterns in terms of which we can formulate sensible
restricting criteria on the instances of disquotation. In turn, the truth principles we
embrace will then determine the extension of the truth predicate. On this approach,
there is no ‘standard’ interpretation of this predicate at our disposal yet. Thus, if T
occurs both in ϕ and ψ , e.g. in ∀x (Tx → Tx), we will say the expression refers to
every sentence, for the conditional is not reference restricting.
Moreover, complex terms occurring in the scope of T should play a role in the
q-reference of expressions just as they do for m-reference. Let ϕ be a sentence. In
Section 3.2 I stipulated that, e.g. T¬. ϕ m-refers to ¬ϕ and not to ϕ, because the
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former and not the latter occurs in the scope of T. I argued that considering subterms
is neither necessary nor desirable. For analogous reasons, I would like to say that
∀x (x = ϕ → T¬. x) (9)
q-refers, not to ϕ, but to ¬ϕ. Similarly, it seems reasonable to say that ∀x T¬. x
q-refers not to every sentence but just to all negations, and ∀x∀y T(x→. y) to all
sentences of conditional form.
A prima facie sensible way of capturing this idea is to say that universal claims
without a reference-restricting conditional q-refer to what their instances m-refer to,
whereas for those with a reference-restricting conditional only the instances with a
true antecedent matter. But in order to keep m- and q-reference apart, we should add
that the occurrences of the terms in the scope of T in the instances are ‘new’, that is,
they are not present in the sentence itself but are a product of the instantiation of the
quantifiers at issue. For instance, ∀x (x = ϕ → Tx ∧ Tψ) would q-refer to ϕ but
refer to ψ only by mention.
However, this proposal is not general enough. It could be that, intuitively, the rel-
evant instances of a universal statement don’t m- but q-refer themselves to other
sentences, in the presence of embedded quantifiers. Consider the following sentence:
∀x (x = ϕ → ∀y (y = ¬. x → Ty)) (10)
By analogy with (9), (10) seems to q-refer to what ∀y (y = ¬. ϕ → Ty) refers
to. But the latter does not m-refer to any expression. Intuitively, it q-refers to ¬ϕ.
Likewise, the numerical instances of
∀x (BewPA(x) ∧ ∀y T(y→. x)) (11)
are of the form BewPA(n)∧∀y T(y→. n). Although they do not m-refer to any expres-
sion, it looks like they do q-refer, provided that n codes a sentence ϕ. In each such
case, we would like to say that BewPA(ϕ)∧∀y T(y→. ϕ) q-refers to all conditional
sentences that have ϕ as their consequent, due to the right conjunct. Q-reference calls
for a recursive definition whereby q-referents are specified by considering the m- and
q-referents of the quantifier instances of its subsentences. This can be done roughly
along the following lines: a universally quantified expression q-refers to what its
instances newly m-refer or q-refer to, unless it has a reference-restricting conditional,
in which case only the instances with true antecedents are to be considered.
Yet, we should be careful when dealing with strings of quantifiers. Consider, for
example, the following expression:
∀x∀y (BewPA(x∧. y) → Tx) (12)
Intuitively, (12) q-refers just to theorems of PA, as only these fall in the scope of
T in the instances satisfying the antecedent. But if we applied our recursive clause
unrestrictedly, we would be forced to conclude that (12) q-refers to every sentence ϕ
of the language, as each ∀y (BewPA(ϕ∧. y) → Tϕ) m-refers to ϕ. The recursive
clause should be modified to take into account consecutive quantifiers ‘all at once’.
What about expressions of a different logical form, such as ∃v ϕ(v), ¬∀v ϕ(v),
and ∃v (ϕ(v) ∧ ψ(v))? A compositional notion of reference by quantification seems
desirable, as in the case of m-reference. This can be achieved by tying q-reference
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to the presence of quantified expressions as subformulae. In this way, for instance,
sentences of the form ¬∀v ϕ(v) and ∀v ϕ(v) would q-refer to the same expressions.
It would also be desirable to close q-reference under renaming of variables, addition
and removal of dummy quantifiers, and most importantly, under certain valid propo-
sitional transformations that do not add or remove atoms. For example, although ϕ
and ϕ ∧ ∀x (Tx → Tx) cannot always be said to q-refer to the same sentences, the
following pairs of expressions intuitively do: ∀v (ϕ → ψ) and ∀v (¬ψ → ¬ϕ),
∀v (¬ϕ ∨ ψ) and ∀v (ϕ → ψ), ∃v (ϕ ∧ ψ) and ∃v (ψ ∧ ϕ), ∀v ϕ and ∀v ¬¬ϕ, and
∀v ¬ϕ and ¬∃v ϕ. A definition of q-reference that focuses on universal claims but is
closed under these and other propositional transformations could fix the q-reference
of expressions of any logical form, including existential statements.
For this reason, to provide a formally precise definition with the outlined char-
acteristics, we first take a detour that consists in ‘normalizing’ all formulae of LT.
Then, q-reference for sentences is defined in terms of their normalizations. Note
that distinct sentences may have the same normalization. The normalization proce-
dure therefore induces an equivalence relation – having the same normalization –
under which q-reference is closed. The notion, however, is not trivialized, for this
equivalence relation is more fine grained than logical equivalence (cf. Section 2.3).
Call “prime” any atomic or universal formulae, or their negation. The normaliza-
tion of an expression is the result of a series of logically valid transformations that
deliver a formula in alethic disjunctive normal form (ADNF).
Definition 2 (ADNF) A formula is in ADNF iff it contains no dummy quantifiers
and every subformula of the form ∀v ϕ satisfies the following two conditions:
1. ϕ is a disjunction (of length ≥ 0) of conjunctions (of length ≥ 0) of primes;
2. if ϕ is of the form ψ ∨ χ , then ψ contains all and only the T-free disjuncts of ϕ,
if any (and, consequently, χ contains all of the T-containing disjuncts, if any).
Formulae in ADNF of the form ∀v ϕ are roughly in prenex disjunctive normal
form, as normally defined in textbooks,18 except quantifiers are not rearranged to
appear at the beginning of the formula. The point of writing these sentences in ADNF
is that one can easily see whether or not they take the form of a restricted quantified
claim. Consider a sentence containing T whose normalized form is ∀v ϕ. Clause 1
ensures that ϕ is written in disjunctive form; clause 2 ensures that all of the T-free
disjuncts of ϕ (if any) are pushed to the left. Thus if ϕ is ψ ∨ χ where the disjuncts
of ψ are T-free and the disjuncts of χ are not, the original sentence can be seen to
be equivalent to the restricted quantificational claim ∀v (¬ψ → χ). In this way, the
reference-restricting conditional ¬ψ → χ is made explicit, and ¬ψ is guaranteed to
encapsulate all truth-free restrictions imposed on the quantifiers ∀v. If, in contrast, ϕ
is not a disjunction or ψ is not T-free, the quantifiers ∀v in ∀v ϕ are unrestricted.
Since formulae in ADNF cannot contain conditionals or existential quantifiers,
the first step in the normalization of an expression is to replace these connectives
18See, for instance, Boolos et al. [2, §19.1].
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with negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, and universal quantifiers, making use of
the standard definitions. Let τ : LT → LT carry out these replacements, that is,
τ(ϕ → ψ) := ¬τ(ϕ) ∨ τ(ψ) and τ(∃v ϕ) := ¬∀v ¬τ(ϕ). Once conditionals and
existential quantifiers have been removed, normalization proceeds in stages. It con-
sists of successive transformations of each subformula of the form ∀v ϕ into ADNF,
starting from those with fewer embedded quantifiers, i.e. of lesser depth. Let dep
assign numbers to universally quantified formulae without conditionals or existential
quantifiers as follows:
dep(∀v ϕ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if ϕ is atomic
dep(∀v ψ) if ϕ := ¬ψ
max{dep(∀v ψ), dep(∀v χ)} if ϕ := (ψ ∧ χ)
max{dep(∀v ψ), dep(∀v χ)} if ϕ := (ψ ∨ χ)
dep(∀uψ) + 1 if ϕ := ∀uψ
For every formula ϕ without conditionals, existential quantifiers, or dummy
quantifiers, its i-normalization is the result of successively applying the following
transformations to each subformula ∀v ψ of depth i:
1. Replace every subformula of the form ¬(ψ1 ∨ψ2) and ¬(ψ1 ∧ψ2) with (¬ψ1 ∧
¬ψ2) and (¬ψ1 ∨¬ψ2) resp. until they don’t occur any longer, starting with the
innermost.
2. Erase all double negations.
3. Replace every subformula of the form ψ1 ∧ (ψ2 ∨ ψ3) and (ψ2 ∨ ψ3) ∧ ψ1 with
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ∨ (ψ1 ∧ ψ3) and (ψ2 ∧ ψ1) ∨ (ψ3 ∧ ψ1) resp. until they don’t occur
any longer, starting with the innermost.
4. In every subformula of the form ∀v(ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm) (where each ψi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
is not itself a disjunction), rearrange the disjuncts into χ1 ∨χ2 such that the ones
not containing T (if any) occur in χ1, whilst the others (if any) occur in χ2.
Since every step in the i-normalization of a formula involves only finitely many
transformations, the process always terminates. Therefore, we can introduce the
following definition:
Definition 3 (Normalization) The normalization ϕ∗ of a formula ϕ is the result of
erasing all dummy quantifiers in τ(ϕ) and, if there are any quantifiers left, performing
successive i-normalizations starting with i = 1 until a fixed point is reached.19
By way of example, consider the following sentence (we assume BewPA(x) is
already in ADNF):
∀z∀x∀y (∃z∃w (z = w→. y ∧ ¬Tz) → BewPA(x) ∨ y = ¬. x) (13)
To normalize it, we first apply τ to get rid of conditionals and existential quantifiers:
∀z∀x∀y (¬¬∀z¬¬∀w ¬(z = w→. y ∧ ¬Tz) ∨ BewPA(x) ∨ y = ¬. x)
19It’s guaranteed that we reach a fixed point, for the maximum depth of ϕ’s subformulae is always finite.
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Then, we then erase the dummy occurrence of ∀z at the beginning and 1-normalize
the resulting expression, that is, we distribute the negation over the disjunction and
erase double negations in ∀w ¬(z = w→. y ∧ ¬Tz) – the only subformula of depth
1 – obtaining:
∀x∀y (¬¬∀z¬¬∀w (z = w→. y ∨ Tz) ∨ BewPA(x) ∨ y = ¬. x)
Next, we 2-normalize the sentence above, erasing the double negation in
∀z¬¬∀w (z = w→. y ∨ Tz), the only subformula of depth 2, obtaining:
∀x∀y (¬¬∀z∀w (z = w→. y ∨ Tz) ∨ BewPA(x) ∨ y = ¬. x)
Finally, we 3-normalize the latter, erasing the double negation and swapping disjuncts
so that the T-free ones occur on the left. The result is the normalization of (13):
∀x∀y (BewPA(x) ∨ y = ¬. x ∨ ∀z∀w (z = w→. y ∨ Tz))
We can see this is a notational variant of
∀x∀y (¬BewPA(x) ∧ y = ¬. x → ∀z∀w (z = w→. y → Tz))
so the first pair of quantifiers is restricted by the formula ¬BewPA(x)∧ y = ¬. x, and
the second pair by z = w→. y. As another example, note that the normalization of
∀x (Tx → Tx) is just ∀x (¬Tx ∨ Tx), as none of the steps 1-4 can be applied. The
quantifier is, thus, unrestricted.
Proposition 1 For every formula ϕ, ϕ∗ is in ADNF and is logically equivalent to ϕ.
A similar result can be found in Picollo [21], together with a proof. We are
finally in a position to provide an adequate and precise definition of reference by
quantification. Let n abbreviate n1, . . . , nm ∈ ω, and n abbreviate n1, . . . , nm.
Definition 4 (Q-reference) Let ϕ,ψ be sentences. ϕ q-refers to ψ iff ϕ∗ has a sub-
sentence of the form ∀v χ s.t. χ is not a universal statement, T occurs in χ , and one
of the following holds:
1. χ := (χ1 ∨ χ2), T doesn’t occur in χ1, and χ2[n/v] q-refers or newly m-refers
to ψ , for some n ∈ ω s.t. N  ¬χ1[n/v].
2. Either χ := (χ1 ∨ χ2) and T occurs in χ1 or χ is not a disjunction, and χ [n/v]
q-refers or newly m-refers to ψ , for some n ∈ ω.
Roughly, the definition of q-reference is intended to capture the idea that the q-
referents of universally quantified claims are the sentences their (possibly restricted)
instances refer to. Note that it can be easily turned into a (fairly cumbersome)
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recursive definition that bottoms out in m-reference.20 In the simple cases, where
there are no embedded quantifiers, q-reference is defined purely in terms of the m-
referents of the instances, whereas in the presence of embedded quantifiers, the latter
may also q-refer. In what follows I offer a variety of examples to illustrate how the
definition works and to show that it gives the correct verdicts in paradigmatic cases.
Definition 4 deals adequately with simple cases of restricted quantification. For
instance, it entails that GRfnPA q-refers just to all theorems of PA. In its normal-
ization, ∀x (¬BewPA(x) ∨ Tx), ∀x is followed by a disjunction. Thus, by clause 1,
GRfnPA q-refers to every sentence each Tn newly m- or q-refers to, provided that
N  ¬¬BewPA(n), that is, that n codes a theorem of PA. Thus, Definition 4 closely
follows clause 2 of the incomplete notion of reference introduced in Section 2.3.
What’s more, since every formula of LT can be normalized, this definition provides
a complete account of reference by quantification.
Clause 2 deals with unrestrictedly quantified claims, such as ∀x Tx and
∀x (BewPA(x)∧Tx). In both cases, the expressions q-refer to whatever each instance,
without restriction, newly m-refers to, that is, to every sentence.
Complex terms in the scope of the truth predicate are dealt with as expected. Take,
for instance, (9) – ∀x(x = ϕ → T¬. x)) – whose normalization is ∀x (x = ϕ ∨
T¬. x). Clause 1 guarantees that (9) q-refers just to ¬ϕ, for it entails that the sentence
q-refers to what T¬. ϕ m-refers to. Likewise, clause 2 entails that ∀x T(x→. 0 = 0),
which is its own normalization, q-refers to whatever each T(n→. 0 = 0) m-refers
to. Thus, the formula q-refers just to all sentences of conditional form with 0 = 0 as
consequent.
The definition also gives the intuitively right verdict when embedded quantifiers
are involved, as in (10) – ∀x (x = ϕ → ∀y (y = ¬. x → Ty)). Its normalization
is ∀x (x = ϕ ∨ ∀y (y = ¬. x ∨ Ty)). By clause 1, (10) q-refers to the q-referents
of each ∀y (y = ¬. n ∨ Ty), provided that N  ¬n = ϕ, i.e. that n is the code
of ϕ. ∀y (y = ¬. ϕ ∨ Ty), in turn, q-refers to what Tn m-refers to, provided that
N  n = ¬. ϕ, i.e. that n is the code of ¬ϕ. As a consequence, (10) q-refers just to
¬ϕ, as desired. Similarly, (11) – ∀x (BewPA(x) ∧ ∀y T(y→. x)) – q-refers just to all
conditional sentences.
20Explicitly: ϕ q-refers to ψ iff ϕ and ψ are both sentences and ϕ∗ has a subsentence of the form ∀vχ
containing T s.t. χ is not a universal statement and either
(i) χ contains no quantifiers and either
a. χ := (χ1 ∨ χ2), T doesn’t occur in χ1 and, for some n ∈ ω s.t. N  ¬χ1[n/v], χ2[n/v] newly
m-refers to ψ , or
b. χ := (χ1 ∨ χ2) and T occurs in χ1 or χ is not a disjunction, and for some n ∈ ω, χ [n/v] newly
m-refers to ψ , or
(ii) χ contains at least one quantifier and either
a. χ := (χ1 ∨ χ2), T doesn’t occur in χ1 and, for some n ∈ ω s.t. N  ¬χ1[n/v], χ2[n/v] newly
m-refers or q-refers to ψ , or
b. χ := (χ1 ∨ χ2) and T occurs in χ1 or χ is not a disjunction, and for some n ∈ ω, χ [n/v] newly
m-refers or q-refers to ψ .
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Finally, strings of quantifiers receive an adequate treatment, as the definition
instantiates them all at once. For instance, ∀x∀y T(x→. y) can be easily seen to refer
to all sentences of conditional form, by clause 2, whilst (12) q-refers just to all
theorems of PA, by clause 1.
Just as the definition of m-reference accounts for the self-referentiality of cer-
tain sentences delivered by the Strong Diagonal Lemma, Definition 4 implies that
‘weakly’ diagonalizing certain predicates also delivers self-referential sentences.21
Let’s look back at the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2.2. Diagonalization applied to
¬Tx delivers the following fixed point:
∀x (x = ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ¬Ty) → ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ¬Ty))
– dubbed λ – whose normalization is
∀x (x = ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ¬Ty) ∨ ∀y ((¬Diag(x, y))∗ ∨ ¬Ty))
By clause 1 of Definition 4, the q-referents of λ are those of
∀y (Diag(∀y (Diag(x, y) → ¬Ty), y)∗ ∨ ¬Ty)
that is, the m-referents of ¬Tn, provided that n is the code of the result of applying
the diagonalization function to ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ¬Ty), i.e. λ. In other words, λ
q-refers to itself. Similarly, we can conclude that the Curry sentence κ in (4) is self-
q-referential, for it obtains by Diagonalization applied to Tx → 0 = 0.
Heck [10] argues to the contrary. They maintain that, unlike m-reference, q-
reference is not a genuine kind of reference, for it cannot account for certain pieces of
self-referential reasoning. As an example, they claim that ‘weak’ Diagonalization is
not sufficient to imply the existence of a real liar sentence in Kripke’s fixed-point the-
ory of truth over the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme; rather, Strong Diagonalization
is needed (cf. footnote 8).22
The salient features of Kripke’s models are that each sentence ϕ and its truth
ascription Tϕ receive the same truth value, and that paradoxical sentences are nei-
ther true nor false. In addition, the biconditional in the Strong Kleene evaluation
scheme behaves in such a way that ϕ ↔ ψ is true only if ϕ and ψ are both true or
both false; if either ϕ or ψ are neither true nor false, so is ϕ ↔ ψ . Thus, as Heck
points out, the equivalence λ ↔ ¬Tλ in (3) delivered by Theorem 1 cannot be true
in Kripke’s models, on pain of triviality. If it were so, then λ and ¬Tλ would be
either both true or both false, so λ and Tλ would receive different truth values in
the model.
21Since our definitions are intended to capture not reference simpliciter but alethic reference, they do not
allow us to conclude that every sentence delivered by Theorem 1 is self-referential. For a more general
result of this kind, see the definition of reference by quantification in Picollo [21].
22Kripke’s [17] semantic account consists of a family of partial models 〈N, +, −〉 expanding N to LT,
in which T is assigned not only an extension, +, but also an anti-extension, −, and numbers in ω
may belong neither to + nor to −. Truth-in-a-model is then defined over the Strong Kleene evaluation
scheme that assigns truth values ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘neither true nor false’ to each sentence of the language
in a determinate way. In particular, sentences of the form Tt are true in 〈N, +, −〉 if t denotes a number
in +, false if t denotes a number in −, and neither true nor false otherwise.
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From this impossibility Heck concludes that ‘real’ self-reference cannot be estab-
lished by means of ‘weak’ Diagonalization, presumably because they believe that
without the equivalence between λ and ¬Tλ there is no liar sentence. However, it
can be easily shown that the way in which, e.g. λ is obtained entails that its truth
value must coincide with that of ¬Tλ in every – classical or non-classical – expan-
sion of N (and thus, λ is a true liar sentence), forcing λ to be neither true nor false in
Kripke’s models. Q-reference is a legitimate kind of reference after all.
Together with Definition 1, Definition 4 also allows us to account for the reference
pattern that underlies the 2-liar cycle given by λ1 and λ2 in (5), that results from
diagonalizing the predicate ¬TTx˙. Let λ1 be the following:
∀x (x = ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ¬TTy˙) → ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ¬TTy˙))
Applying clause 1 and the same reasoning as before, λ1 q-refers to Tλ1. Let λ2 be
this sentence. Thus, λ2 m-refers to λ1 and the latter q-refers to the former.
Another interesting example is the Visser-Yablo list. Diagonalizing the predicate
∀z (z > w → ¬Tx(z˙/w)), we obtain the following fixed point:
∀x (x = ∀y (Diag(x, y) → ∀z (z > w → ¬Ty(z˙/w))) →
∀y (Diag(x, y) → ∀z (z > w → ¬Ty(z˙/w))))
This predicate is Y(w). Each instance, Y(n), is a sentence that, by clause 1, q-refers
to the result of instantiating Y(w) in each number greater than n, as expected.
Finally, although the fixed point of the predicate T¬. x that Theorem 1 delivers
does not q-refer to itself, its negation does, as in the case of the strong fixed point of
this predicate in (8).
Unlike m-reference, q-reference is not closed under all valid transformations that
preserve atoms or literals (i.e. atomic and negation of atomic subformulae), not even
for sentences in ADNF. Consider, for instance, ∀x (x = λ∧Tx∧¬Tx) and ∀x (x =
λ∨(Tx∧¬Tx)). These sentences are both logically false, in ADNF, and contain the
same literals, but while the former q-refers to every sentence, the latter only q-refers
to λ.
However, since q-reference depends exclusively on the presence of certain sub-
formulae of the form ∀v ϕ, the notion is compositional with respect to propositional
connectives: ¬ϕ q-refers to whatever ϕ q-refers to, and (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), and
(ϕ → ψ) q-refer to what either ϕ or ψ q-refer to. Note also that q-reference is
trivially closed under renaming of variables and dummy quantifiers.
More importantly, the fact that q-reference is defined in terms of normalization
guarantees that the notion is closed under the following propositional transfor-
mations: the addition and elimination of double negations, the commutativity of
disjunction and conjunction, contraposition of the conditional, the distributivity of
conjunction over disjunction and vice versa, the De Morgan laws, and the interde-
finability of connectives and quantifiers. Furthermore, q-reference is closed under
Leibniz’s Law, and the addition and elimination of tautological antecedents: if ψ is a
formula of L that is true of every n-tuple of natural numbers, ∀v ϕ and ∀v (ψ → ϕ)
q-refer to the same sentences.
Closure under these and other transformations allows Definition 4 to give the intu-
itively correct verdict with respect to existentially quantified statements. For instance,
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as ∃x (BewPA(x)∧¬Tx) is normalized into ¬∀x ((¬BewPA(x))∗ ∨Tx), it q-refers to
the same expressions as ∀x (BewPA(x) → Tx), i.e. to all theorems of PA, as desired.
In general, statements of the form ∃v ϕ q-refer to the same sentences as ∀v ¬ϕ.
This allows the given definition of q-reference to account for the self-referentiality
and other reference patterns of fixed points delivered by the ‘existential’ proof of
Theorem 1, just as in the case of the ‘universal’ proof (cf. Section 2.2).
3.4 Direct Reference, Reference, and Reference Patterns
In the previous section a completely general account of reference by quantification
was provided, extending (an alethic version of) clause 2 of the incomplete notion
of reference to all sentences of the language. We are finally in a position to define
alethic reference simpliciter, as the disjunction of m- and q-reference. However, I call
it “direct reference” or “d-reference”, for short, as an indirect reference relation is
also possible and relevant to our purposes.
Definition 5 (D-reference) Let ϕ,ψ be sentences. ϕ d-refers to ψ iff it m- or q-refers
to ψ .
Observation 3 For all ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ LT:
1. If ϕ ∈ L , ϕ doesn’t d-refer to ψ .
2. If N  s = t , ϕ and ϕ[s/t] d-refer to the same sentences.
3. ϕ and ¬ϕ d-refer to the same sentences.
4. ϕ ∨ χ , ϕ ∧ χ , and ϕ → χ d-refer to ψ iff either ϕ or χ do.
5. If v is not free in ϕ, ϕ, ∀v ϕ, and ∃v ϕ d-refer to the same sentences.
6. ∀v ϕ and ∀uϕ[u/v] d-refer to the same sentences, if u is free for v in ϕ,
7. The following pairs of logical equivalents d-refer to the same sentences:
– ϕ and ¬¬ϕ,
– ϕ ∨ ψ and ψ ∨ ϕ,
– ϕ ∧ ψ and ψ ∧ ϕ,
– (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ χ and ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ χ),
– (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ χ and ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ χ),
– ϕ → ψ and ¬ψ → ¬ϕ,
– ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ χ) and (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ),
– ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) and (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ),
– ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) and ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ,
– ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) and ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ ,
– ϕ → ψ and ¬ϕ ∨ ψ ,
– ∃v ϕ and ¬∀v ¬ϕ.
Definition 5 allows us to characterize many reference patterns, including the self-
referentiality of both weak and strong liars, i.e. λ and ¬Tl, and the unfoundedness of
the Visser-Yablo sentences, as will be seen later. Nonetheless, there are other cases
of intuitive self-reference, such as the circularity of cycles, and other problematic
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patterns, such as the unfoundedness of chains, which are not accounted for. Consider,
for instance, sentences λ1 and λ2 in the 2-liar cycle in (5). They directly refer only
to one another. Intuitively, however, they somehow refer to themselves as well, albeit
indirectly. Otherwise, we would get a semantic paradox without self-reference on the
cheap. Furthermore, we can prove the existence of ω-chains, that is, sequences of
sentences, each of which directly refers to the expression coming next.
Proposition 2 (ω-chains) For every formula ϕ(x, v) there is an infinite sequence of
distinct terms t0, . . . , tn, . . . s.t., for every n ∈ ω, the following is provable in PA:
tn = ϕ(tn+1, v)
See Picollo [21] for a proof. Note that, since the terms t0, . . . , tn, . . . are different,
so are the sentences ϕ(t0), ϕ(t1), . . . , ϕ(tn), . . . and, therefore, the numbers those
terms denote. For example, we can obtain an ω-chain for the predicate Tx – a ‘truth-
teller’ chain of sentences Tt0, Tt1, . . . , Ttn, . . . – such that the following are provable
in PA:
t0 = Tt1 (14)
t1 = Tt2
. . .
tn = Ttn+1
. . .
Each Ttn d-refers just to Ttn+1, but intuitively each of them also refers, indirectly, to
all the ones coming later on the list. A more general notion of reference, that is, the
transitive closure of d-reference, is therefore necessary. To define such a notion, we
make use of the following definition.
Definition 6 (Chain of reference) A (possibly infinite) sequence of sentences s.t.
each sentence in the sequence d-refers to the one coming after, if any.
Definition 7 (Reference) Let ϕ,ψ be sentences. ϕ refers to ψ iff there’s a chain of
reference starting with ϕ and ending with ψ .
It easily follows from the definition of reference that λ1 and λ2 refer to themselves,
and that each sentence in the truth-teller chain in (14) refers to every expression that
comes up later on the list. Moreover, we can employ the notions just introduced to
define salient reference patterns, such as the following.
Definition 8 (Self-reference) A sentence is self-referential iff it refers to itself.
Definition 9 (Well-foundedness) A sentence ϕ is well-founded iff all chains of
reference starting with ϕ are finite. Otherwise, we say that ϕ is unfounded.
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Sentences that don’t d-refer to any expression – e.g. every theorem of PA – are
well-founded. Moreover, if a sentence d-refers only to well-founded expressions, it is
also well-founded, for it extends the chains of reference of the latter only by one sen-
tence. For example, ∀x (BewPA(x) → Tx) is well-founded. On the other hand, every
self-referential expression is obviously unfounded. But there are also unfounded sen-
tences that don’t refer to themselves, such as the Visser-Yablo sentences in (6) and
the truth-teller chain in (14). In both cases, sentences on the list refer to all the expres-
sions occurring later on, but never to other statements that occur before them, thus
never to themselves.
If the given definitions are correct, the Visser-Yablo sequence shows that the
self-reference diagnosis of semantic paradoxes is mistaken after all: there are non-
self-referential (ω-)paradoxes – at least if self-reference is taken, as we have been
assuming, to be a property of sentences. But this doesn’t mean there is no use for the
new notions of reference in the quest for the root of paradox or in the formulation
of interesting truth theories. Although restricting our truth principles to non-self-
referential expressions will not always lead to sound truth systems, restricting them
to well-founded sentences will, as I show in the companion piece, [22]. This sug-
gests that it is not self-reference but unfoundedness which is behind the semantic
paradoxes.
4 Conclusions
Let’s recapitulate. We have seen that the two conceptions of reference and self-
reference that are commonly deployed in the literature on semantic paradox and
incompleteness are defective or incomplete. Whereas the naı¨ve conception is out-
right trivial, it was not clear how to turn the incomplete notion, which seems to be
somehow on the right track, into a full-fledged account. What’s more, a great deal
of scepticism surrounded this project. In particular, it has so far been unclear how
a notion of self-reference along those lines could account for the self-referential
character of ‘weak’ fixed points – e.g. of λ.
Throughout this paper I have provided a precise account of reference and self-
reference via truth that supplements the incomplete notion, extending it to all
sentences of LT. It is my hope that this account dispels some of the doubts affect-
ing the notions of reference and self-reference for formal languages, at least in the
context of truth. The notion of reference by quantification introduced in Section 3.3
explains the self-referentiality of many expressions obtained by Diagonalization –
e.g. λ – in terms of the way the fixed points are constructed. There is subsequently
no need to appeal to a naı¨ve and trivializing account of self-reference according to
which it is the equivalence this result yields – e.g. between λ and ¬Tλ – that is
responsible for self-reference.
More generally, unlike the naı¨ve conception of reference, the definitions of m-
and q-reference given in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 account for the reference patterns
underlying many expressions, including the liar and also liar cycles and Visser-Yablo
sentences, without invoking any provable or true equivalences, but attending to the
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syntactic structure of these expressions. The new notions seem to answer Milne’s
worries satisfactorily and, hopefully, help dissipate to some extent the scepticism
over reference and self-reference aired by Leitgeb and Cook.
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